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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
DAMON SPRINGER, #95-A-7666,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #16-1-2012-0004.03
INDEX # 2012-11
ORI #NY016015J

-againstANDREA W. EVANS, Chairwoman,
NYS Board of Parole,

Respondent.
____________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Damon Springer, verified on December 13, 2011 and filed in
the Franklin County Clerk’s office on January 4, 2012. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Franklin Correctional Facility, is challenging the January, 2011 determination denying
him parole and directing he be held for an additional 24 months. An Order to Show Cause
was issued on January 11, 2012 and a Supplemental Order to Show Cause was issued on
April 20, 2012. The Court has received and reviewed respondent’s Answer, including
Confidential Exhibits B, E, G and I, verified on June 1, 2012, as well as petitioner’s Reply
thereto, filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s office on June 22, 2012.
On October 31, 1995 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, New York County,
to consecutive, indeterminate sentences of 8a to 25 years and 6b to 20 years upon his
convictions of the crimes of Manslaughter 1° and Conspiracy 2°. After having been denied
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discretionary parole release on two previous occasions1, petitioner made an additional
appearance before a Parole Board, by teleconference, on January 5, 2011. Following that
appearance a decision was rendered denying petitioner parole and directing that he be
held for an additional 24 months. Both parole commissioners concurred in the denial
determination which reads as follows:
“THIS PANEL HAS CONCLUDED THAT YOUR RELEASE TO
SUPERVISION IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE OF
SOCIETY AND THEREFORE PAROLE IS DENIED. THIS FINDING IS
MADE FOLLOWING A PERSONAL INTERVIEW, RECORD REVIEW AND
DELIBERATION. OF SIGNIFICANT CONCERN IS THE CLEAR INTENT
TO PRESENT A DANGER TO THE COMMUNITY BY YOUR ACTIONS IN
OBTAINING, CARRYING AND OPENLY USING A HANDGUN.
POSITIVE FACTORS CONSIDERED INCLUDE YOUR GOOD BEHAVIOR
DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS. YOUR RECEIPT OF MULTIPLE
DISCIPLINARY VIOLATIONS PRIOR TO THAT TIME IS OF CONCERN.
IN ADDITION, YOUR INSTANT OFFENSES OF MANSLAUGHTER 1ST
AND CONSPIRACY 2ND INCLUDE CONDUCT OVER A PERIOD OF
SEVERAL MONTHS.
TO GRANT YOUR RELEASE AT THIS TIME WOULD SO DEPRECATE
THE SERIOUSNESS OF YOUR OFFENSE AS TO UNDERMINE RESPECT
FOR THE LAW.
WHILE YOUR POSITIVE PROGRAMS AND
COMMUNITY SUPPORT ARE NOTED, THE PROBABILITY YOU WILL
LIVE AND REMAIN AT LIBERTY WITHOUT VIOLATING THE LAW IS
NOT FOUND TO BE REASONABLE GIVEN THE FACTORS NOTED
ABOVE.”
The parole denial determination was affirmed on administrative appeal. This proceeding
ensued.
At the time of petitioner’s January 5, 2011 parole interview Executive Law §259i(2)(c)(A) provided, in relevant part, as follows: “Discretionary release on parole shall

1

Petitioner was denied discretionary parole release and directed to be held for an additional 24
months following an initial Parole Board appearance on January 7, 2009. That parole denial determination
was apparently reversed in some fashion and petitioner reappeared before a Parole Board on January 5,
2010 but was again denied release.
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not be granted merely as a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such
inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the
seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law. In making the parole release
decision, the guidelines adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fiftynine-c of this article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and interpersonal relationships with
staff and inmates . . . [and] (iii) release plans including community resources,
employment, education and training and support services available to the inmate . . .” In
addition to the above, where, as here, the minimum period of imprisonment was
established by the sentencing court, the Board must also consider the seriousness of the
underlying offense (with “due consideration” to, among other things,

the

“recommendations of the sentencing court . . .” ) as well as the inmate’s prior criminal
record. See Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) and §259-i(1)(a).
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be
judicial functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law
§259-i(5)) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See
Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis, 26
AD3d 614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements. See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
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Petitioner initially argues that the Parole Board failed to take into consideration
many of the statutory factors enumerated in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) but instead
relied exclusively on the nature of the crime underlying his incarceration as well as a
portion of his disciplinary record dating back more than five years. According to
petitioner the Board was presented with evidence of his “ . . . good disciplinary record, his
exceptionally academic[,] vocational and therapeutic achievements and contributions in
prison programs, and letters of reasonable assurance. Yet the Board did not base its
decision on a single one of these factors, other than a [disciplinary] violation FIVE
YEARS PRIOR TO HIS BOARD APPEARANCE for taking an extra milk from the
mess hall, in which petitioner received 20 days keep lock.” (Emphasis in original).
A parole board need not assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is required
to consider in connection with a discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to
expressly discuss each of those factors in its written decision. See Martin v. New York
State Division of Parole, 47 AD3d 1152, Porter v. Dennison, 33 AD3d 1147 and Baez v.
Dennison, 25 AD3d 1052, lv den 6 NY3d 713. As noted by the Appellate Division, Third
Department, the role of a court reviewing a parole denial determination “...is not to assess
whether the Board gave the proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether the
Board followed the statutory guidelines and rendered a determination that is supported,
and not contradicted, by the facts in the record. Nor could we effectively review the
Board’s weighing process, given that it is not required to state each factor that it considers,
weigh each factor equally or grant parole as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior.
Comfort v. New York State Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, 1296 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, a review of the Inmate Status Report and transcript of the parole
interview reveals that the Board had before it information with respect to the appropriate
statutory factors including petitioner’s therapeutic and vocational programming,
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academic achievements, disciplinary record, release plans, community support, as well
as the circumstances of the crimes underlying his incarceration. See Zhang v. Travis, 10
AD3d 828. The Court, moreover, finds nothing in the hearing transcript to suggest that
the Board cut short petitioner’s discussion of any relevant factor or otherwise prevented
him from expressing clear and complete responses to its inquiries. In view of the above,
the Court finds no basis to conclude that the parole board failed to consider the relevant
statutory factors. See McAllister v. New York State Division of Parole 78 AD3d 1413, lv
den 16 NY3d 707, and Davis v. Lemons, 73 AD3d 1354. Since the requisite statutory
factors were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary
parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the denial
determination in this case was affected by irrationality bordering on impropriety as a
result of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature of the crimes underlying his
current incarceration and the earlier portion of his prison disciplinary record. See De Los
Santos v. Division of Parole,___ AD3d___, 2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 05225, and Cruz v. New
York State Division of Parole, 39 AD3d 1060.
Petitioner next argues that the Parole Board did not review the 1995 sentencing
minutes and thus failed to consider the parole recommendations of the sentencing court
as required by Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) and §259-i(1)(a). In this regard the
petitioner asserts that “ . . . prior to sentencing, petitioner’s Attorney informed him after
consultation with the Court and District Attorney, that if petitioner accepted the
negotiated plea ‘the court did not see any reason why petitioner should not be released
after serving his minimum, providing petitioner manned up and took responsibility for
his crime and worked towards rehabilitating himself while incarcerated.[’]”
It is not disputed that the Parole Board considering petitioner for discretionary
release did not have before it a copy of the 1995 sentencing minutes. The respondent
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asserts, however, that an unsuccessful effort was made to secure a copy of such minutes
from the sentencing court. In support of this assertion the respondent annexed to its
answer as Exhibit C a copy of the affidavit of Rachel Simone, Senior Court Reporter,
Supreme Court, New York County (the“Simone Affidavit”). According to Ms. Simone she
was assigned to the relevant part of the Supreme Court, New York County, at the time of
petitioner’s sentencing.

In the Simone Affidavit the following is alleged: “I have

thoroughly reviewed my stenographic notes for the requested date(s) [10-31-95] and can
find no such record. As a result of the foregoing, I am unable to provide a transcript.”
A Parole Board considering a DOCCS inmate for discretionary release is clearly
required to take into account any parole recommendation of the sentencing judge and is
therefore ordinarily required to have before it a copy of the relevant sentencing minutes.
See Standley v. New York State Division of Parole, 34 AD3d 1169 and McLaurin v. New
York State Board of Parole, 27 AD3d 565. Notwithstanding the foregoing, however,
where the failure of a Parole Board to consider the relevant sentencing minutes is the
result of a documented inability on the part of the sentencing court to provide a copy of
the minutes, such failure does not render a parole denial determination irrational to the
point of impropriety. See Smith v. New York State Division of Parole, 81 AD3d 1026,
Geraci v. Evans, 76 AD3d 1161, Blasich v. New York State Board of Parole, 68 AD3d 1339
and Freeman v. Alexander, 65 AD3d 1429. In any event, there is nothing before this
Court to suggest that the sentencing court expressed any specific parole recommendation
on the record during sentencing proceedings. As noted previously, the petitioner merely
alleged that his attorney informed him that the sentencing court “ . . . did not see any
reason why petitioner should not be released after serving his minimum . . .” See Blasich
in New York State Board of Parole, 68 AD3d 1339.
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Finally, petitioner asserts that the Parole Board erroneously considered him for
discretionary parole release under the provisions of 9 NYCRR §8002.3(b) instead of
§8002.3(a). Petitioner, however, failed to exhaust administrative remedies with respect
to this argument since it was not advanced on administrative appeal. Judicial review in
this proceeding is, therefore, precluded. See Rossario v. Fischer, 95 AD3d 1528 and
Santos v. Evans, 81 AD3d 1059.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the Decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.

Dated:

July 27, 2012 at
Indian Lake, New York.

__________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice
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